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GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT OF ADVANCED CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY--POWER REACTORS 
AND THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT 
George Eads 
Richard R. Nelson 
If present budgeting plans obtain, the Federal Government is committed 
to spend well over $5 billion during the next decade on developing reactors 
for civilian electrical power and supersonic transport aircraft for civilian 
apassengers. Even in a trillion dollar GoN.P. economy, this is lot of money 
and these programs warrant a hard look for that reason alone. Public 
discussion of the power reactor program has been quite limited. The considerable 
controversy surrounding the continuation of the SST has been motivated to 
a large degree by fears of the aircraft's effects on the environment. It 
does not appear to have been generally recognized that these two programs 
may herald a significant de facto revision in the institutional structure 
within which a considerable portion of American industry operates.* 
This paper will develop and discuss the following characteristics of 
these two programs. First, they represent an almost unprecedented extent 
and kind of governmental subsidy for the development of products for production 
and sale by private companies through the market to the general public. 
Second, in no sense can it be argued that there is a pressing "need" for 
these new departures. Rather, these programs were pushed to attention 
at the Federal policy making level as technological opportunities that 
*For one instance in which this point is recognized see: Albert Karr, 
"Subsidy, Regulation, and Uncle Sugar," The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1970, 
P• 12. 
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"should" be exploited~ Further, the early advocacy of these programs came 
largely from within Government, not from outside. Thus the genesis, as 
well as the nature, of these programs warrants a hard look for precedent. 
Third, the arguments for the programs were and are that industry would not 
undertake them rapidly or intensively enough without massive Governmental 
aid. Yet very little in the way of detailed persuasive analysis was, or 
is being, presented as to why the conservative attitudes of private industry 
~ere counter to the public interest. Fourth, what we believe to be the implicit 
rati~nale for the programs poses basic issues regarding the "standard ways 
of doing things" in these industries. Only the blind cannot forsee that 
after the particular programs in question are completed there will be a next 
generation of programs posing virtually the identical policy issues. More 
important, there will be projects in other technological fields presented 
as candidates for this kind of subsidy. The basic issues posed by these 
programs involve the whole institutional structure..of ind·us.t'rii;il. R and, p, 
including who proposes, who decides, and who funds and takes the risks. 
The New Departure: Federal Subsidy for Development of New Products 
for Production and Sale by Private Industry to the General Public 
The programs of the Federal Government play a vast and vital role in 
the research and development activities of the United States. In 1969, 
of a total national Rand D spending of roughly $26 billion, approximately 
$17 billion were Federal funds. The purposes of the public Rand D programs 
were numerous and diverse, but for the most part can be placed in two 
- 3 -
categories.* The first is the development of new technology for the public 
sector. The dominant programs here, of course, are defense related, but 
the Government also undertakes or supports Rand D to improve the ability 
of public agencies to protect the public health, guard against dangerous 
drugs and medicines, support construction of public facilities like airports 
and roads, improve air safety, etc. In all of these cases the Government 
is charged with performing a particular function and the Rand Dis under­
taken to permit it to perform more efficiently. The second purpose is to 
advance basic knowledge or knowledge of highly diverse interest or use. Here 
the basic research support programs of the NSF and NIH are clear examples, 
Recently, of course, NASA has been a dramatic new departure in Government 
sponsorship of a scientific and technological venture both for the intrinsic 
interest of the adventure, and because of the belief that diffuse and 
widespread benefits will be an important by-product. 
Governmental spending for both of these purposes has traditions that 
go back far into American history. The Constitutional responsibility for 
setting and maintaining standards for weights and measures soon led to a 
small research effort in the Treasury Department. The army arsenals performed 
"Rand D" on a variety of weapons. Coast and Inland surveys and explorations 
early were undertaken and financed to enable the army and the navy to protect 
the country better, and because it was believed that the knowledge would 
be of widespread interest and utility to the citizens. 
But by and large the Federal Government has steered shy of supporting 
or undertaking Rand D aimed specifically at improving a particular class 
*For a more detailed discussion see Richard Nelson, M. J. Peck, 
E. D. Kalachek, Technology, Economic Growth, and Public Policy, Brookings, 1967, 
Chapter 8. 
- 4 -
of products or services whose normal channel of distribution is through 
the market. Where this has been done, the product in question has had strong 
claims to being a merit good, the quality of which "ought" to be improved 
or cost reduced (like those connected with better health), or a large 
fraction of the society was concerned with production of the product (as 
the early rationale for public support of agricultural research), or the 
product was closely linked with defense (as aviation). There also are a few 
examples of public Rand D support for specific industries (like coal) 
that were believed to be "in distress". But by and large in all of these 
cases public funds tended to go into research and exploratory development, 
with commercial development being left to private initiative. 
The pre-1960 public support of research relevant to civil aviation 
is directly relevant. In 1915 the National Advisory Committee on Aeronau~ 
tics (NACA) was created to spur the development of American aviation. During 
its heyday during the 1920's and 1930's, NACA pioneered in the development 
and operation of Rand D facilities for general use (wind tunnels, for example), 
in information collection and dissemination, and in basic research and ex­
ploratory development. It undertook major work on aircraft streamlining, 
design of engine parts, properties of fuels, and structural aspects of 
aircraft design, and it built and tested a variety of experimental hardware. 
But NACA did not directly support the development of particular commercial 
airplanes. Indeed, the idea that such a role should be assumed by the 
Federal Government was explicitly rejected in the late 1940's when Congress 
refused to approve bills that would have appropriated Federal funds to finance 
the construction of a jet transport prototype in spite of claims that 
private industry could not hope to raise the sums required and that U.S. 
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leadership in commercial aviation would be surrendered to the British, 
whose government was supporting prototype programs, unless such aid was 
forthcoming.* 
Until recently the programs of Atomic Energy Commission in support of 
the NACA support of aircraftcivilian power reactors were similar in spirit to 
technology.** The ammanded Atomic Energy Act of 1954 established a more 
or less explicit division of responsibility between the AEC and private 
enterprise, with the Government's role being limited to support of research, 
the building of experimental reactors, the operation of facilities for testing, 
information dissemination, etc. That private companies operated many of 
the AEC laboratories and facilities, and that these clearly were and are 
viewed as places where private companies and personnel could "learn" and 
gain experience, departs from the NACA experience. But private enterprise 
clearly was left the job of bringing the technology into practice on its 
own initiative. 
During the late 1950's and throughout the 1960 1 s, the Atomic Energy 
the extent of its involvement in the developmentCommission gradually increased 
of civilian nuclear power, both in terms of detailed planning and .s.ubs.:i,dy 
of development, and in terms of admonishing industry to do more than it 
seemed to want to do. Similarly, during this period the Federal program 
in support of supersonic transport technology evolved from a traditional 
*e.g., see "Costs and Jets, 11 editorial, American Aviation, June 1, 1948, 
p. 1; and "U.S. Airlines to Buy Eritish?" Aviation Week, August 29, 1949, pp. 31-32. 
**For a discussion see Philip Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power: 
Economic Issues and Policy Formation, Twentieth Century Fund, 1963. 
NACA type of effort to one of planning and financing final product development 
and admonishing the industry to try harder, These represent major new 
devartures in the Government's role in Rand Don products produced by 
private companies and distributed through the marketo 
The Genesis: Technology Opportunity Push from Inside the Government 
The obvious question is what triggered the significant new departures. 
Both conventional wisdom and relatively careful research would suggest that 
major new Governmental policies usually stem from perception of a pressing 
problem, or pressure from a politically potent external interest group, or 
both. But for these programs this does not seem to have been the case. 
In most of the more recent studies of policy making (more generally 
decision making in large organizations), new policy departures or major 
policy modifications have been described as usually coming about as a result 
of perceived problems with the status quo ante. While it sometimes is not 
fully clear what comprises a "problem," the use of the word suggests something 
different than simply a perceived opportunity to do better. What is interesting 
about the two cases in question is that they do not fit this mold. There 
was no pressing problem or need to call forth the escalation of public 
policy in civilian power reactors or civil aviation. Rather the programs 
evolved as they did largely on the grounds that an opportunity existed 
that was perceived as not being exploited fast or hard enough. 
Up until just recently the electric power industry of the United States 
certainly was not high on the list of those whose performance was widely 
perceived as "unsatisfactory". John Kendrick's study of Productivity 
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Trends in the United States shows a long-run rate of productivity growth in 
electric power more than three times the national average. Relatedly the 
price of electric power has fallen significantly over the years and the rise 
in consumption has been very rapid. Concern about growing scarcity of con­
ventional fuels goes back at least as far as Jevons in the late 19th century 
and such concern clearly was and is a prime factor in arguments for rapid 
development of nuclear power. But from the earliest analyses of nuclear 
power studies generally have reached relatively sanguine conclusions regarding 
short run energy supply adequacy, and have given no cause for alarm even 
for the long run. In their monumental study published in 1960, Schurr and 
Netchert projected that coal reserves were ample in quantity and kind to 
meet the demands at least to the end of the century without rising costs.* 
They also projected sufficiency of natural gas reserves for the medium 
run future. They saw petroleum reserves as more problematical, but for the 
purposes of generation of electricity, coal can be substituted for petroleum 
without difficulty. The 1966 study of Energy Rand D and National Progress, 
which was undertaken with the express purpose of identifying sources of concern, 
reached the conclusion that significant shortages of conventional fuels, 
or sharply rising costs of extraction, were not likely in this century.** 
Progress in civil aviation has been, of course, even more spectacular 
than in electric power. Successive generations of new aircraft have made 
travel vastly faster and more comfortable, and prices of air travel (even 
not counting the great quality improvements) have until recently fallen 
*Sam Schurr and Bruce Netchert, Energy in the American Economy, Johns 
Hopkins, 1960. 
**Energy Rand D and National Progress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. 
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relative to the average. Indeed, at least one recent study has concluded that 
the development of new aircraft perhaps has proceeded at too fast a rate, 
with CAB rate control authority precluding effective price competition by 
older planes to counter the speed advantages of the new, thus providing 
an artificially profitable market for new high performance aircraft.* · 
Certainly the "problems" with respect to air transport, as they have increasingly 
been perceived during the 1960's and 1970's, involve air space crowding and 
safety, growing congestion to and from and at the airports, and noise; 
problems not of a sort resolvable by a supersonic transport. 
The statement that there was no perceived problem, at least in the short 
and medium run, to which nuclear reactors and supersonic transports represented 
a possible solution is a bit too strong. There was and still is a felt 
"need" to do something (preferably on the cheap) for the less developed 
countries and, in the early days, nuclear power seemed such a possibility. 
U.S. development of the supersonic transport was influenced powerfully by 
a perceived "need" not to let other countries get ahead of us in civil aviation; 
relatedly, there was concern about the balance of payments consequences 
if this occurred. But (as we shall discuss later) the case for the programs 
on these grounds· :scarcely is powerful, and the major arguments were posed 
in terms of "opportunities that ought to be seized." 
Just as recent models of the policy process place limited weight on 
"opportunity push", most views of governmental policy processes generally 
ascribe policy changes to outside demands. While increasingly attention is 
being paid to the fact that governmental agencies and civil servants have 
*William A. Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and 
Imperfections, especially Chapter 3, "Rivalry Through Service Quality." 
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore (in press). 
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wills of their own, for the most part this influence is viewed as conservative. 
In the power reactor and supersonic cases, not only were the departures 
apparently attempts to push opportunities rather than meet difficulties; 
the pushing seems largely to have come from within government rather than 
from the outside, 
Advocacy of the electrical equipment producers and the private utilities 
was an important factor behind the "freeing up" of nuclear information and 
Rand D from the tight control of the AEC manifested in the AEC "industry 
participation" program of 1951.* The 1954 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act 
explicitly established Governmental commitment to basic research, and 
exploratory development of civilian atomic power was in part at least 
responsive to industry and utility demands. But, according to Mullenbach, 
the equipment suppliers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, certainly cannot 
be counted among the early enthusiasts for the growing Federal activism as 
it evolved, Neither the private utilities. Indeed the private utilities 
tended strongly to resist the building of Governmental reactors on sizeable 
scale, fearing that this might strengthen the tendency for nuclear power 
to go "public." While there was less resistance on the part of the utilities 
to governmental subsidy of private construction and ownership of large 
experimental plants, in the early days this seems to have been more in the 
spirit of "if you insist that we build, you will have to share the costs" 
than of active advocacy. Of course, as the equipment suppliers gradually 
invested in their nuclear design and production capabilities they have grown in­
creasingly enthusiastic about governmental programs to subsidize the procurement 
of nuclear power, 
*For a good history see Mullenbach. 
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But the early thrust appears to have come largely from within the AEC 
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The major noted advocacy speeches 
during the late 1950 1s and early 1960's were by Commissioners and Congressmen. 
They seem to have been the active force behind the gradual escalation of 
subsidy from assistance in studying the projects (in the mid 1950's) to 
paying a share of the capital costs (1960) to subsidizing reactor design 
costs. The most recent development is the proposed governmental committment 
to the achievement of an economic breeder reactor by the 1980 1s involving 
explicitly AEC detailed planning, subsidation, and monitoring of large demon­
stration plants for designs that are at least close to produceable and saleable. 
Similarly the SST program seems to have been more the result of pushing 
from within government than pressure from the outside. The program appears 
to have bubbled up as the result of a coalition between NACA (by the NASA) 
people who had been researching aspects of supersonic flight in the traditional 
NACA context, and people at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
The early attitude of the airlines appears to have been that an SST was 
inevitable but support for governmental subsidy of development was, at best, 
guarded. The manufacturers, naturally, were willing to proceed with development 
of an SST under governmental funds, but the idea does not seem to have been 
theirs. 
The early conception of the program involved an unprecedented element of 
direct governmental assistance in the development of a commercial aircraft, 
but it was not argued at that time that Federal funding would have to play a 
very major role. As wi.th atomic energy, as the sixties progressed the extent 
of governmental involvement and subsidy escalated. The key events seem to 
have been the demise of the B-70, which, it had been hoped, would provide 
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considerable spillover assistance to the development of a commercial SST, 
the British-French agreement to proceed with the Concorde, and the growing 
awareness on the part of SST advocates that the manufacturer would not proceed 
unless the subsidy was increased substantially.* The Governmental committment 
has grown from a $12 million feasibility study in 1961, to notions of Governmental 
cost sharing of up to 50% of development costs through prototypes, to the 
present level of 90% cost coverage by the Government, and the recent implicit 
committment to carry the development through the post~prototype stages if 
industry is reluctant. 
The Lack of a Persuasive Explicit Rationale 
That these programs are major new departures for Government involvement 
in Rand D; that they represent attempts to seize "opportunities" rather than 
reactions to "problems", 11;nd that the initiative came largely from within the 
Government, are not, of course, reasons for condemnation. Many students of 
Governmental Rand D policies, including one of the authors, have called for 
significant expansions in the Governmental role. That Governmental policies 
usually tend to be responsive to problems and not opportunities is a reason 
for concern; such a bias in the policy-considering trigger is bound to be 
non-optimal. 
By and large the traditional Federal Rand D programs can be and have 
*In this connection, see Testimony of Elwood Quesada, Former Administrator, 
Federal Aviation Agency, in "Economic Analysis and Efficiency of Government," 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, Joint Economic 
Committee, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, part 4, Supersonic Transport Development, 
PP• 925-927. 
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been justified on the grounds that the decentralized market mechanism would 
not generate the right kind of Rand D. This is likely to be the case where 
the public sector has preempted the market, as in defense and the postal 
service. For basic research support, the argument is that benefits are not 
reflected adequately or at all in private profit opportunities. In the 
early days of agricultural research support, the argument was that farmers 
were "too small" to do Rand D, and that there were many important problems 
where seed and equipment suppliers had no financial interest. There was 
also a pervasive feeling, in contrast to the ideology with respect to 
manufacturing, that agricultural advances should be a public good. 
The reasons advanced for Federal support of prototype construction of a 
nuclear power reactor and an SST have not been of these sorts. Instead, 
it has been argued that the traditional public programs--undertaking or financing 
basic research, building and testing experimental hardware, providing research 
and testing facilities--are not !ufficient by themselves to motivate private 
industry to undertake advanced development soon enough or intensively enough 
to achieve technological success in the near future. The magnitude of the 
funds required, the length of the development period, and the risks involved 
are held to transcend the capabilities of existing capital markets and firms. 
Very large financial requirements and a long lead time, combined with 
considerable uncertainty about returns and costs, are indeed possible reasons 
why some kind of public action (though not likely subsidy) might be in order, 
if these were associated with a very high expected rate of return. The 
elasticity of capital supply to firms, their time horizons, and their ability 
to spread risks, certainly can be stretched so far that profitable ventures 
cannot be seized without some Federal action. Having admitted this, however, 
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we should not underestimate the ability of capital markets and firms today to 
undertake ventures of bold size and risk, and a long time horizon. IBM is 
reported to have risked $5 billion in the early 1960's to develop the System/360 
family of computers. This sum is somewhat higher than the total estimated 
cost of the SST program through delivery of the first aircraft. It was 
raised at a time when IBM's sales, total assets, and net worth were not 
significantly larger than those of Boeing Aircraft today, to say nothing 
of the combined assets of Boeing and General Electric, the two prime contractors 
on the SST project. Furthermore, many companies have shown a willingness 
to support R and D on projects where it was anticipated that retvr,ns would be 
quite distant and uncertain. Even •in the late 1920's, the electrical companies 
were undertaking Rand Don television, and Dupont was investigating high polymers. 
The key reason why American industry has been unwilling to invest in 
Rand Don power reactors and on the SST of a magnitude and kind that the 
advocates think appropriate is that the expected rate of return is very low, 
much below that of other uses of funds and resources. Cost-benefit studies 
by program advocates show this, even under what many outsiders regard as 
rigged assumptions. Were this not believed, both in the Government and outside, 
much more consideration would have been given to Governmental assistance and 
risk sharing, rather than to one form or another of subsidy. 
The argument that public funds should be provided h~ rested largely 
on the case that the private financial benefits understate the true benefits 
to society, or that the private financial costs overstate the real costs, 
or both. In the controversy over the SST, for example, factors such as the 
program's impact on the balance of payments, its effect on employment in the 
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aerospace and related industries, and, to a lesser degree, technological 
spillovers alleged to be of value to the military have been advanced in support 
of Federal prototype funding.* Yet underlying these claims is a belief that 
the most important externality is the assurance that the program's continuation 
gives of continued U.S. dominance in the World commercial aircraft industry. 
Commercial dominance is equated with technological superiority, and it is 
claimed that failure to exploit the technology embodied in the SST at the 
earliest possible moment will mean a loss of technological leadership, which 
in turn will mean an irreversible loss of commercial position. 
Such thinking apparently has its roots in the experience of the aircraft 
industry in the production of military hardware. In the past twenty-five 
years the American aircraft industry has grown prosperous by producing military 
designs which offer often marginal improvements in performance over existing 
designs at substantially greater cost. In military aviation sometimes 
(but certainly not always) even a marginal technological advantage is the 
difference between life and death. Yet to apply such a development strategy 
to a commercial product is to invite commercial disaster. As Phillips states: 
"While it is undoubtedly true that particular aircraft have been added to the 
fleets [of the airlines] because of non-cost aspects of performance and because 
of the influence of new equipment on passenger demand, the record over 
the years is strong in suggesting that, absent favorable cost behavior, none 
or only few of any new type of aircraft is demanded."** 
*Albert Karr, "Clash Over the SST," The Wall Street Journal, September 
23, 1970, p. 1. 
**Almarin Phillips, Technological Change and the Market for Commercial 
Aircraft (draft), pp. 138-139. 
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That the United States has dominated the commercial aircraft market 
in the postwar period is undeniable. Recent estimates reveal that over 
80 percent of the World's commercial airline fleet was built in this country.* 
Phillips' research makes it clear, however, that this dominant commercial 
position rests not so much upon the general technical superiority of U.S.­
built commercial aircraft but instead upon the good record of the American 
manufacturers in deciding when to embody what technological advances into 
commercial products. This record undoubtedly has been aided by the fact 
that in each case, the decision to produce a commercial design has been made 
by a private company risking its own funds. There is no doubt, for example, 
that if Congress had been willing to appropriate the necessary funds in 1948, 
the U.S. and not the British could have been the first to introduce jet 
transports into commercial service. It is clear from a study of the designs 
then being proposed, however, that the early U.S. jet transports would have 
been no more commercially viable than was the Comet I or Cornet II. And how 
much would it have aided the reputation of the American commercial aircraft 
industry had it, and not the British, been the one to discover the catastrophic 
effects on pressurized aircraft of metal fatigue? 
In contrast to the U.S. experience, the record of the British aircraft 
industry in the postwar period has been relatively dismal. The British 
government has been prep~red to cover up to 50 percent of the costs of launching 
civil aircraft designs and to assure a base market for these designs by 
requiring British flag carriers to purchase the resulting product, regardless 
*Statement of James }1. Beggs, Undersecretary of Transportation, 
"Economic Analysis and Efficiency of Government," op. cit., p. 962. 
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of operating costs.* As a result the British have rung up a string of technologi­
cal successes that, by and large, have been commercial failures. Even the 
massive infusion of Governmental aid has not served to maintain the health 
of the British aircraft industry, and, with few exceptions, the aircraft 
produced have not made a favorable contribution to Britain's balance of payments.** 
While proceeding under forced draft from original idea to finished 
product under the notion that a new technology must either be seized or 
lost certainly does not contribute to, and may even hinder, the attainment 
of a commercially successful product, it is nonetheless possible that such 
an accelerated program may serve to allow society to reap any benefits asso­
ciated with the attainment of a particular technology sooner rather than 
later in time. In the cases of both atomic energy and the supersonic transport, 
it is apparent that the technology would be very valuable to have around, 
if it were developed to anything close to its potentiala In the hearings, 
speeches, and dialogues the word "inevitable" has been used regarding both 
of these technologies. In the cost benefit studies of the breeder reactor 
program a considerable amount was made of the fact that, given the large 
and rapidly growing market for electric power, hastening the day that we 
have breeder reactors that are superior economically to existing technologies, 
will enable us to start our benefit flow earlier, and enhance the total benefits 
we shall reap. In the SST studies, although to a lesser extent, and more 
*Robert E. Baldwin, Nontariff Distortions of International Trade. 
Brookings, 1970, p. 119. This latter commitment alone was costing the British 
government an estimated $80 million in subsidy to British European Airways in 1968. 
**The relatively poor commercial performance of the Caravelle, an 
aircraft ordered in prototype form by the French government in 1953 and which 
first flew in 1955, is yet another example of the point being made. The 
Caravelle anticipated the technology later embodied in the BAG 111 and DC-9 
by almost ten years, yet this in itself was not enough to guarantee a market 
for the aircraft, 
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connected with the concern about the expansion of a particular competition 
technology--the Concorde--, the same kinds of arguments for hastening the 
inevitable are made, implicitly or explicitly. 
However the very fact that these technologies, as they approach their 
potential, will be valuable (and this is what makes them "inevitable") means 
that one cannot compare the achievement of the technology under the proposed 
program to accelerate development against the null alternative that it never 
will be developed. Yet this is done in all of the cost benefit studies we 
have seen. The very attractiveness of the technologies and their potential 
profitability almost assure that even under the existing regime of private 
and public institutions, they will ultimately be developed. The key question 
is timing and scheduling of effort, and overall Rand D strategy. 
Common sense, history, and detailed analysis all tell us that there is 
a time-cost trade off.* Public subsidy or more direct programs can buy 
us time, but we pay for speed. The costs of hastened development must be 
weighed against the benefits of gaining an attractive technology sooner. 
While the formal cost benefit studies stress the benefits of faster achievement, 
they either ignore or deny that we could achieve the same results more cheaply 
if we didn't hurry so much. But this is really the issue. 
Why are the costs and risks too great in these programs for private 
enterprise to bear? Because at the targeted pace of development one cannot 
proceed sequentially and in small bites. The technological advances that 
we have achieved in many industrial and product fields, largely through private 
,'(For a discussion see Frederick M. Scherer, "Government Research 
and Development Programs," in Robert Drofman (ed.), Measuring the Benefits 
of Government Expenditures, Brookings, 1965. 
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efforts, have been truly spectacular. But the progress has been sequential, 
and efforts to achieve major advances in technology, like the first jet 
transports, and the recent jumbo jets, have been paced over time, with the 
major product development efforts waiting until components were available, 
until research findings had clarified many of the dark places, and until the 
final expensive surge looked relatively certain and the returns high. 
A case can be made that this strategy of Rand D implies that the long run 
"profits" from the early exploratory and experimental work may tend to diffuse 
away from the market grasp of private business firms; hence, some kind of 
governmental programs may be needed to assure that this part of the process 
is as intensively undertaken as the long run promise of the technology warrants.* 
And such programs were in fact being undertaken by NACA for aviation, and by 
the AEC in the field of power reactors, before the recent thrust to greater 
haste. 
The rationale for the current programs totally neglects that the problem 
is one of time-cost trade off. Why such special haste on these programs? 
If these, why not others? We have not seen good anewers to these questions; 
indeed they do not appear to have been asked. How much is it worth to get 
these technologies faster (E.£! how much is it worth to get the technologies 
at all)? How much is it costing us to speed up their achievement (not 
how much is their development likely to cost under the proposed program)? 
What will be the technological spillovers, balance of payments effects, and 
employment effects of having these projects now rather than in the future and how 
*See Nelson, Peck and Kalachek, Chapter 9, 
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do these spillover effects compare with those associated with programs that 
will not be undertaken due to our haste in these projects?* We think that 
if these quesitons were posed and valid answers obtained, few reasonable 
men would advocate the SST or the nuclear power reactor programs as they are 
presently constituted. 
There are two deeper issues which we want to explore in the following 
section. One is the implication of these programs for institutional structure. 
The other involves concern about the way the nation looks at technology. 
Questions of lnstitutional Structure and the Role 
of Science and Technology 
If past experience be a guide, the conscious national decision to achieve 
very high rates of technical progress in a particular field is tantamount to 
a decision that traditional decentralized modes of Rand D organization, 
decision making, and risk taking, be superceded by a much more concentrated 
and centralized structure.. The Manhattan Project to develop the atomic 
bomb, during World War II, probably was our first national experience with 
extreme forced feeding of technological progress, and the project involved 
and required not only large amounts of resources but also a quite elaborate 
control and monitoring network. During the post War era, and particularly 
since the mid 1950's, the same kind of time urgency has marked much of military 
Rand D. Increasingly the military Rand D program has been concentrated 
in a few large and ambitious projects, each one under (at least attempted) 
*For a recognition of the relevance of these questions see: "The 
SST Decision," editorial, The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1970, p. 14. 
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tight control from the center and the overall "program" under increasingly 
tight central monitoring. Project Apollo, of course, is another example of 
this Rand D style associated with an emphasis on speed or technology stretching 
with little concern with the cost, and with detailed central planning. 
The presently proposed reactor program and the SST represent the transference 
of the Rand D style of the Manhattan Project, post 1950 military Rand D, 
and the programs under NASA, to two new areas, with the objective of achieving 
faster progress. In these fields it is clear that the traditional division 
of labor and responsibility now is or soon will become obsolete, unless there 
is a radical reversal of policy. The Federal government increasingly is adopting 
the role of deciding in detail the Rand D projects that will be undertaken, 
paying the bill and taking the risks, and being generally responsible for 
the kinds of products and processes that evolve. 
This clearly is so, and has received political sanction, in the civil 
reactor field. This is not to say that the AEC finances or undertakes all 
of the work, although it does for a large share of it. But the AEC does 
monitor private effort and seeks to influence it, as well as directly con­
trolling the publicly supported programs. In the breeder reactor program 
the AEC finally has gone to the length of specifying an overall development 
plan in some detail, stating what the private sector should be doing as well 
as the public. We think it goes without saying that, unless some radical 
rethinking occurs, this "plan" will be progressively updated, ultimately 
will look to the generation of reactor technologies beyond the present breeders, 
and represents the evolution of a long run way of doing things in civilian 
reactor technology. 
It is less apparent, but we think it true, that the SST program represents 
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a very large permanent increase in governmental detailed responsibility for 
Rand Din civil aviation, unless there is a change in policy. Governmental 
planning and programs, backed by funds, cannot help but drive out or greatly 
reduce private planning and programs, if these governmental efforts carry 
through development as is the new departure. Financing, and detailed planning 
of, final product development simply is very different in its impact on 
private Rand D than support of basic research and exploratory development 
as in the old NACA days. Public funding of the early stages of the Rand D 
process can be expected to ~pur private development spending by making clearer 
the development options, and reducing the cost of the developments needed 
to achieve a given performance enhancement. But if the Government finances 
development itself, private efforts are at a competitive disadvantage with 
respect to the subsidized programs. This is particularly so when, as appears 
to be the case in civil aviation, the Governmentally backed efforts aim for 
such major advances that competition is not possible unless there are 
comp~n~able ,private funds in the development till. Under the new precedent, 
development of civil aviation is likely increasingly to follow the military 
pattern, with government and industry jointly deciding what to develop 
(with the Government bearing the lion's share of the cost and the risk), 
rather than the traditional pattern of civil aviation development in the 
United States. At the least there will be a "hypersonic" development to 
follow the supersonic development and already there is discussion of an 
"overall development strategy" for civil aviation. 
It is not a short step, it is a very large step, to a significant additional 
expansion of the sectors to which this structure will be applied. However 
we think we already can see a significant expansion of Federal funding of, 
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and planning of, medical development as well as research. Here, as in atomic 
energy and aviation, the key ingredients seem to be, first, a large and competent 
group of scientist-technicians within the government and, second, a feeling 
that the pace of technical progress in the field could be much faster. 
Several additional directions of likely expansion, fueled by like conditions, 
can be identified. The Interdepartmental Study of Energy Rand D and National 
Progress provided a long list of areas in which it was judged Rand D was 
"promising" and governmental encouragement (subsidy?) possibly warranted; the 
concentration of Federal largesse on atomic energy cannot continue for long. 
Likewise there is growing concern about concentration of Federal funds for 
transportation R and D on aviation, and it is a good bet that soon other 
Iareas of transportation will b8gin to get more attention. Perhaps most 
striking, and most in need of watching, is the growing discussion of the pos­
sibilities of tapping the R and D capabilities built up in private enterprise 
through the defense and space programs (now the SST program) and the public 
capabilities of the AEC laboratoTies for civil Rand D more broadly. 
We are bothered by these institutional concomitants of a philosophy 
that technological opportunities should be seized, and rapidly, and that a 
leisurely pace of prhate development is a good reason for public forced 
feeding, for two basic reasons. The first is really a reflection of the 
fact that these policies involve climbing far out along the time cost trade 
off curve; this kind of Rand D institutional structure and strategy is likely 
to be very inefficient as well as costlyo Our second concern is that Governmental 
commitments to particular technologies and products pose an unusually difficult 
public control problem. 
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One of the most striking aspects of the history of technological advance 
in most American industries is the diversity of sources. New products, 
processes, inputs, and equipment for an industry have come from firms in the 
industry, suppliers, purchasers, new entrants to the industry, outside individual 
inventors. The process certainly was not orderly and planned, and one has the 
impression that had one tried to impose order and plan the result in many 
(most?) cases would have been much worse. Many developments that early seemed 
to be very promising did not pan out. Many important breakthroughs were 
relatively unexpected and were not supported by the experts in the field. 
While detailed case histories are not plentiful, and many of these do not shed 
light on the question, one has the impression that in most of the technically 
progressive industries, like chemicals and electronics, most of the bad bets 
were rather quickly abandoned, particularly if someone else was coming up 
with a better solution, and good new ideas generally had a variety of paths 
to get their case heard. 
Military Rand D programs since the mid 1950's, the civil reactor programs, 
and experience to date with the supersonic transport are a sad contrast. 
In these areas the early bet batting average has been dismal, just as it has 
been in the domain of decentralized development. But there has been a proclivity 
to stick with the game plan, despite mounting evidence that it is not a good 
one, that appears only in exceptional cases in areas where Rand Dis more 
decentralized and competitive. The case of Convair throwing good money after 
bad on the 880 development rightly is regarded as an aberration, and the fact 
that General Dynamics had learned its style in military Rand D undoubtedly 
was a contributing factor.. But this kind of thing is the rule, not the 
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exception, in military Rand D. The B-58 and TFX were pushed all the way 
through development despite mounting unfavorable evidence 9 The B-70 and 
Skybolt were halted short of procurement, but long after the signals were 
clear that they were bad ideas" A considerable amount of "bunching" 
of Rand D efforts into a few large projects, with considerable stickiness 
in changing the list of projects or their internal strategy, probably is inherent 
in technology forcing. It has been argued elsewhere, however, that the extent 
of these characteristics in military Rand D compounds the problems, as does 
the "double control" system of private management and detailed public monitoring. 
Our belief is that these aberrations will be applied with the big push philosophy, 
making a naturally costly strategy even more costly. It is a good bet that 
Boeing would not have persisted so long in pushing its swing wing SST design 
had the bulk of the funds been its own, and had it the ability to make that 
decision on its owno We think the signals are clear enough that the present 
design is in trouble. Only momentum and the awkwardness of changing the game 
plan now carry the project forward in its present conception. Similarly, 
throughout the history of the AEC's power reactor program there have been 
complaints that the AEC was persisting in Rand Don a design long after evidence 
had accumulated that this was not an attractive route, and, conversely, that 
the AEC has been very sticky about initiating work on new concepts. 
If we were not in so much of a hurry we would feel less compelled to adopt 
an institutional mode that not only is highly inefficient, but carries some 
rather dangerous implications regarding the role of Government as a product 
advocacy lobbyist. It is rather surprising that the producers of coal and oil 
and power generating equipment using conventional fuels have not raised 
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more noise than they have regarding the pressure being applied to the utilities 
by the AEC to install nuclear rather than conventional power. While the evidence 
on the nature of thermal pollution and nuclear waste problems now is far from 
clear, and nuclear power still probably looks good compared to conventional 
power in pollution and waste problems, we think we should feel some discomfort 
that a strong government lobby has a stake in the issue. There has been more 
vocal concern about the implications of a governmental financial stake in the 
SST, perhaps because of the explicit "revenue sharing" provisions in the program. 
But even without a financial stake, the relevant government agencies, and the 
higher executives and congressmen who support their program, have a personal 
credibility stake in the success of the products and processes they push so 
hard. It is relatively clear that the success of the SST program, measured 
in almost any dimension that has been talked about, will depend highly on the 
fare structure allowed and encouraged by the CAB. The CAB can go a long way 
towards making the SST program a financial success, by fighting for high fares 
(to cover the higher costs of the SST relative to the jumbo jets) and uniform 
fares (so that the lower cost technology will not be able to compete in the 
dimension where it is strongest). This implication of the "big push" policies we 
find very disturbing. 
These programs are dangerous also in that they reinforce an already 
strong tendency on the part of the nation to look to technological fixes as 
the preferred way to deal with problems. One consequence of the technology 
fix cult, and it already is apparent in several areas, is an overstress on 
Rand Din areas where other routes may strike more directly at the problem, 
or be more efficient if less glamorous. It is clear, for example, that 
while Rand D can help improve our shelf of relevant technology for dealing 
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with problems of urban congestion and pollution, there exists technology now 
that can deal with many aspects of the problems, and what would do the most 
good would be significant changes in incentives and costs facing congestors 
and pollutors. Indeed there is some reason to fear that the quest of an 
Rand D fix may retard really dealing with the problems. Present solutions 
to congestion and pollution are politically fractionous. The argument that 
with Rand D we can have better solutions provides an excellent excuse for 
avoiding ,_doing mqch nm,,. 
We are advocates of more Governmental Rand D both in support of industrial 
technology and on pressing social problems. The kinds of programs that are 
sensible, however, are those that recognize explicitly the uncertainties that 
reside in far reaching Rand D and that avoid making large committments to 
particular approaches prematurely. There is a strong case for extending the 
kinds of programs that characterized NACA during the twenties and thirties and 
the AEC during the fifties to a general policy in support of applied research 
and experimental engineering development. A specific institutional format for 
doing this has been suggested in another place.* For Rand Don social 
problems where public sector agencies are responsible for the provision of 
the relevant good or service in many cases Federal Rand D support will have 
to extend through final design, but here too it is important to avoid the style 
of Defense and NASA. We even see some merit in programs with the flair and 
excitement (but we suspect very small economic or scientific payoffs) of Project 
Apollo. However, the recent evolution of the power reactor and SST programs 
is movement in the wrong direction. It is not clear whether the.se particular 
programs can be turned off or cut back. But it -4,s extremely important that 
they not become precedents. 
*Nelson, Peck, Kalachek, Chapter 8. 
